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  1Governance and Performance of Microfinance Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe 







Microfinance is the provision of loans and other financial services to the poor. The microfinance 
institution (MFI) has evolved as a result of the efforts of committed individuals and assistance 
agencies to reduce rural poverty by promoting self-employment and entrepreneurship. The MFI 
has two goals—provide financial services to the poor (outreach) and cover its costs 
(sustainability). Achieving these two goals is challenging and that is why it is important to study 
what mechanisms of control promote better performance. 
Microfinance is a significant and growing industry, yet there are no studies that explore 
the link between governance and performance. Data on the performance of MFIs are hard to 
obtain and governance practices are not transparent. Understanding what governance 
mechanisms work is important because MFI managers control significant resources. In Central 
and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States (CEE & NIS) the asset base of these 
organizations is estimated to be 1.2 billion dollars (Foster, Green, and Pytkowska, 2003). This 
paper uses unique data from recently conducted surveys in the region to study the relationship 
between governance and MFI performance, and to quantify its effect.  
 
Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Specifications  
 
Governance in microfinance refers to the mechanisms which ensure donors and equity investors, 
that their funds will be used according to the intended purposes.
1 Such control mechanisms are 
necessary because the goals of managers may differ from the goals of providers of funds. For 
example, MFI managers may work for fulfilling the mission of the MFI but they may also have 
preferences for non-pecuniary rewards or less work. In the corporate governance literature, this 
problem is known as the agency problem. The manager, who does not own the resources of the 
firm called an agent for the provider of finance, who is called principal. The costs associated 
with the agency problem are called agency costs. 
The key mechanisms of an effective governance framework are ownership (including 
institutional and managerial ownership), board and board structure, CEO (manager) and director 
(board member) remuneration, auditing and information and the market for corporate control 
(Keysey, Thompson & Write, 1997).  This paper explores all mechanism besides ownership as 
the database used does not contains data on ownership. 
MFIs have some unique characteristics that complicate the study of their governance. The 
need to reach as many poor clients as possible in order to fulfill the outreach mission as well as 
the fact that many MFIs are organized as NGOs makes them similar to non-profit organizations. 
Many MFIs are regulated or supervised by a regulatory body, and many MFI collect deposits 
which makes them similar to banks. That is why this paper uses insights from the corporate 
                                                 
1 This definition is based on Shleifer and Vishny (1997) definition of corporate governance as the mechanism 
through which shareholders (providers of funds) ensure themselves that they will receive maximum return on their 
investments. 
  2governance literature as well as from the literature on governance in banks and in non-profit 
organization. 
 
External Markets  
 
The manager of a corporation is disciplined by market forces, through the labor market for 
managers and through the market for takeovers. These market forces have a limited role in 
microfinance as the market for MFI managers is thin and most MFIs do not have true owners. As 
the microfinance industry grows and matures, however, other market forces have started to play 
important role in promoting manager accountability. 
Competition for donations and customers, as well as the presence of for-profit firms 
affects the behavior of non-profit firms and that of MFIs. As they strive for survival, these firms 
may change ideological perspective and mission if this would bring more donor money (Rose-
Akerman, 1986).  Indeed, until recently information on the performance of individual MFIs was 
scant. With the increase in competition for donor funds and for clients, MFIs and their managers 
are becoming more transparent. Many MFIs are hiring external auditors to certify their financial 
statements. Moreover, the competition for donors has contributed to the appearance of MFI 
rating agencies which serve as another external mechanism of control.
2 
MFIs that provide deposit services, as well as some credit only MFIs are regulated and/or 
supervised by a government agency. Deposit taking institutions have additional stakeholders (a 
group of people with similar interest in the organization). First, depositors become the principal 
as they own the resources used by the MFI. Second, if deposits are insured by the government 
then taxpayers have a stake in the organizations. From efficient governance standpoint, 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1993) show that depositors should act as bad times principals, while 
equity holders should act as good time principals but since depositors are dispersed, an external 
agency should be involved when (ex-post) efficiency requires interventions. That is, for 
organizations which collect deposits, regulation is an efficient control mechanism. Regulation, 
would, however, affect MFI governance by shifting the emphasis away from both outreach and 
from return because it would promote less risky behavior by the Manager. 
The role of these external mechanisms of control is evaluated with the following 
empirical model:  
 
Performancei,t, =  1 α  +  1 β Regulated i ,t  +  2 β Rated i,t-1 +  3 β Controlsi,t  + 






β t i, ε      (1) 
 
where Performance is measured by outreach and profitability indicators, Regulated is a dummy 
for supervision/regulation by a government agency, Rated is a variable that indicates whether the 
MFI was rated in the preceding period. This specification avoids the endogeniety problem, which 
is the problem that arises if the manager request rating in the year when he/she observes good 
                                                 
2 In the law literature, Manne 1999 proposes similar solution for NGOs governance, namely that an external, for-
profit company (which is disciplined by market forces) serve as a monitoring mechanism. NGOs will contract with 
it to be monitored in terms of charitable and financial aspects of the operations. However, these private 
organizations according to Manne should not be raters, rather they should have the right to sue NGOs to rectify 
violations.  
  3performance. Better performance in the following year following does not suffer from 
endogeniety bias, and would indicate that the rating agency has identified weak points that were 
consequently addressed by the manager, while worse performance would indicate that these 
problems were not addresses. Lack of statistical significance would indicate that rating is not an 
effective governance mechanism. Controls is a vector that includes MFI Age and MFI Age 
Squared to account for possible non-linear relationship between MFI age and MFI performance, 
Log(Total Assets) to account for MFI size, and Audit to control for the quality of the financial 
statement. The last element  t i, ε  is an error term. 
 
Managerial Compensation as an Incentive Aligning Mechanisms 
 
According to the agency literature, compensation that includes both performance based element 
and a fixed element is the best mechanism to align the interests of managers with that equity 
holders and donors. Indeed, performance related bonuses are used in the microfinance industry.
3  
The empirical literature on corporations confirms the positive pay performance link, but the 
sensitivity is relatively small; in the widely quoted study Jensen and Murphy (1990) show that 
for large corporations, pay-performance sensitivity is only$3.25 for $1,000 increase in 
shareholder value. Recent papers show that this sensitivity has been increasing (Murphy, 1999)  
Banks are regulated industries and regulation may substitute or complement incentive 
features in managerial contract. High powered incentives may align too much the interest of the 
managers with that of equity holders and induce managers to take higher risk at the expense of 
depositors, who may suffer if the MFI fails. For the US bank industries, John, Saunders and 
Senbet (2000) have argued that regulation that takes into account the top management salary may 
be more effective than capital regulation in ameliorating risk-shifting incentives. In banks, the 
higher leverage (use of deposits) requires that the manager’s interest are not aligned with the 
interest of equity holders, thus low pay-performance sensitivity is recommended (John & John 
1993).  Indeed, pay-performance sensitivity in banking has been smaller than that in other 
industries (Houston and James, 1995; John and Qian, 2003; Adams and Mehran, 2003).  
In non-profits, many forms of incentive pay are illegal. In fact, it has been shown that the 
asymmetric information between clients and managers (that is, managers know more about the 
product than clients) makes fixed salaries the better choice for non-profit managers (Easley and 
O'Hara, 1986). Specifically, since managers get fixed salaries, they are indifferent between 
telling the truth and lying and will tell the truth. Clients and donors will find the information 
provided by non-profit managers more credible and this will lead to better funded and better 
performing firms. 
Instead of offering performance based compensation as the agency theory would suggest, 
non-profits boards may be able to recruit managers by offering compensation packages 
combining lower wages with some perquisites so that only individuals committed to the mission 
will self-select to take (Handy and Katz, 1998). Additionally, the appeal of a position of power in 
non-profit firms may be sufficient to attract good managers (James, 1983). It has been shown 
that if wages paid to NGO managers are similar to that paid to for-profit manager, and if the 
NGO technology is superior to that of the for-profit firm, the NGOs will dominate the industry 
(Scott and Hopkins, 1999)
4  
                                                 
3 Martin Holtmann has showed this for the case of loan officers, who could be viewed as agents of the managers. 
4 Donors fund both for-profit and non-profit MFIs and this paper models exactly a situation where donors fund both 
NGOs and for-profit in the first period and only the efficient organizations in the second period. As the industry 
  4To evaluate the role of the managerial compensation on MFI performance the following 
empirical model is used: 
 
Performancei,t =  1 α  +  1 β Fixed Wagei ,t  +  2 β  Higher Wage i,t +  3 β Regulated i ,t + 






β t i, ε      (2) 
 
where, Performance are indicators for outreach and financial results, Fixed Wages is a dummy 
for fixed pay, that is a wage not based on performance, Regulated  is a dummy for regulated 
MFIs and Controls is a vector of controls for MFI size, age, manager’s experience and quality of 
the financial statements. 
 
 
The MFI board  
 
Boards are very important in microfinance because of the relative limited role of external market 
forces. The board of directors is an internal governance mechanism that helps resolve the agency 
problems between owners and managers. Board members are elected by shareholders to monitor 
and advice managers on behalf of owners. The degree of alignment of board composition and 
shareholders’ objectives is measured in the empirical corporate governance literature by the 
proportion of outside/independent directors. More independent directors (non-employees, not 
related to the company) are expected to act as better monitors and advisors. Empirical studies 
have found both positive and negative relationship between the proportion of outside directors 
and firm value (review of the literature in Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). 
In the boardroom, the major conflict is between the manager, who has incentives to 
capture the board and thus ensure his job and non-pecuniary benefits, and the directors (board 
members) who have incentives to maintain their independence to monitor and, if necessary, 
replace the manager. Directors are paid, and the market for their services should ensure diligent 
monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983) although corporate directors may also have considerable 
incentives to slack off or get along with managers (Holmstrom, 1999). 
In non-profit organization, the absence of residual claimants (owners of capital) avoids 
the donor-residual claimant agency problems (Fama and Jensen (1983a).
5 Internal agents 
(managers and employees) will still desire to expropriate donations but the non-profit board 
allows for separation of management from control. Although board members of non-profit firms 
are rarely paid, they do provide continuous personal time and/or wealth, and would want to do a 
good job. Board members not interested in the mission leave and substitution is done by the 
board itself based on mutually agreed upon criteria (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). Indeed, empirical 
evidence shows that board tenure is important in non-profits and members with longer years on 
the board perform their monitoring function better (Oster and O’Reagan, 2003). 
                                                                                                                                                             
matures, donors are increasingly concerned with efficiency and are willing to fund only the efficient MFIs so the 
prediction that the lending/saving technology, not staff wages will determine survival is an important insight. A 
caveat of this model suggests that wages could even be lower if the personnel is very committed to the MFI mission. 
5 The agency theory refers to equity owners as residual claimants, because in case of a failure they have a claim on 
the residual cash flows of the firm. Jensen and Meckling (1976) because they stand to loose if the company loose 
their investments. 
  5Non-profit boards are typically comprised of outsiders and the proportion of outsiders as 
a measure of independence has too little variation to be useful in explaining board efficacy.
6 
Research has focused instead on how board diversity affects firm performance. There is evidence 
that women directors spend more time on monitoring activities, while the occupation of the 
board members does not affect time spent on monitoring, but affects fundraising (Oster and 
O’Reagan, 2003). Corporate performance is also affected by board diversity. Firms with higher 
proportions of women and ethnic minorities perform better according to a recent study of the 
largest Fortune 1000 companies (Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003).  
Since some MFIs are subject to regulation they may share some of the specific 
characteristics of boards in regulated industries. Fore example, boards in banking have a larger 
proportion of outside directors than boards of firms in manufacturing (Adams and Mehran, 
2003).  
Board efficacy can also be influenced by board size, with larger boards being less 
effective than smaller boards because when the board gets too big, free riding by some directors 
may become an issue (Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorch, 1992). This hypothesis is confirmed by 
studies on both large corporate boards and board of small firms (Yermack, 1996; Eisenber et al., 
1998). In non-profits firms, monitoring by the board declines with firm size although fundraising 
increases with size (Oster and O’Reagan, 2003). Banks, however, have larger boards than firms 
in other industries (Adams and Mehran, 2003).  
The influence of board size and tenure on MFI performance is evaluated by  
 
Performancei,t =  1 α  +  1 β Board Sizei ,t  +  2 β  Board Size Squared i,t +  3 β Unlimited Term i ,t 
 +  






β t i, ε       (3) 
where Board size is the number of board members, Unlimited Term is a dummy that measures 
the tenure of the board, and Number of Board Meetings measures the annual meetings of the 
board. 
The MFI board has unique characteristics. It is not unusual that several major 
stakeholders are represented on the board. The major stakeholders in an MFI are donors, equity 
investors, insiders (employees and managers), creditors (who often provide significant amount of 
the funding available for microloans), and non-affiliated independent directors. Board activities 
and therefore, MFI performance in terms of outreach and sustainability may be affected by the 
relative power of these various stakeholders. In addition to controlling for board independence 
therefore, we estimate a model that takes into account the representation on the board by all of 
the major stakeholders.  
Recent theoretical work on boards has shown that managers’ actions (which determine 
firm performance) and board structure (proportion of independent directors) are endogenously 
determined (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). Empirical studies account for this endogeniety by 
including lagged dependent variables and by specifying systems of equations where firm 
performance, board composition and action are endogenously determined (Rowe and Davidson, 
2002; Firth, Fung, and Rui, 2002). To address this endogeniety problems, performance indicators 
                                                 
6 Callen and Falk (1993) have defined as insiders board members who receive pay but as pay is atypical in nonprofit 
boards, this measure is not very useful. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), Oster and O’Reagan, 2002 measure 
independence by the power of the CEO to nominate the board and vote on board member selection. 
  6are regressed on lagged dependant variables that capture board diversity and stakeholder 
representation.  
 
Performancei,t =  1 α  +  1 β Insidersi ,t-1  +  2 β  Non-affiliated Outsiders i,t-1 +  3 β Donor Representatives i ,t -1
 +  
 






β t i, ε  
(4) 
where Insiders is the lagged value of the proportion of the employees(normally the manager) 
who are a voting member on the board, Non-affiliated Outsiders is the lagged value of the 
proportion of the non-affiliated board members, Donor Representatives is the lagged value of the 
proportion of board members who are representatives of donors, Creditor Representatives is the 
lagged value of the proportion of board members who are representatives of the creditor, 
Investor Representatives is the lagged value of the proportion of board members who are 
representatives of an investor and Controls is a vector of variables that control for MFI age, MFI 
size, quality of financial statements, and supervision by a regulatory agency. 
To study how board diversification affects MFI performance the following equation is 
estimated 
 
Performancei,t =  1 α  +  1 β Women Directors i ,t-1  +  2 β  Expatriates i,t-1 +  3 β Community Leaders i ,t -1
 +  
 






β t i, ε   (5) 
 
where Women Directors is the lagged value of the proportion of women sitting on the board, 
Expatriates is the lagged value of the proportion of expatriates sitting on the board, 
CommunityLeaders is the lagged value of the proportion of local community and government 
representatives, Non-voting is the lagged value of the proportion of non-voting members, and 
Controls is a vector of controls for MFI size, MFI age, regulation by a regulatory body and 




Data for this study come from three surveys. The first survey was conducted in 1998 by the 
Microfinance Center, Poland which is the network organization of the MFIs in the region. Both 
members and non-members were contacted. The survey collected data on MFI boards, 
governance and performance. The second survey was conducted in 2001 by the same regional 
network. In this survey, MFIs reported their performance, organizational and product 
characteristics for the period 1998-2001. Since 2000, many MFIs have been sending annual 
reports to the Network Center in Poland and their initial profile was updated for 2002 by the 
MFC staff. The data on MFI performance, board characteristics and mechanisms of external 
control were used to develop the database. The microfinance industry is new in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States and not all MFIs had a board in place at the 
time the survey was conducted. In fact, in 2001, of the 150 organizations that participated in the 
survey (the microfinance center has made a serious attempt to collect info from almost all MFIs 
  7in the region), only 71 had a board. All MFIs with boards were contacted in 2002 and asked to 
fill in a second survey with detailed questions on governance. The response rate was nearly 50% 
as 34 organizations completed the survey. The performance and governance indicators of these 
organizations are the basis for the study. 
In microfinance, performance is measured by accounting-based indicators of outreach 
and of financial performance.
7,
8 In general, accounting measures are considered more-
appropriate for longer run studies because managers may be able to manipulate financial 
statements for a year but their ability to manipulate statements in longer period is limited.   
The variables used in the regression analysis are defined in Table 1. The variable that 
serves as a proxy for the level of outreach is Log(No. active clients) while, while sustainability is 
proxied by ROE, ROA, OSS, and FS.  The summary statistics is in Table 2.  
 
Discussion of the Results 
 
External mechanisms of control play a limited role in improving MFI performance. Regulation 
affects negatively MIF outreach but this relationship is not statistically significant (Table 3, 
Model 1). This is line with the literature on banks suggesting that the regulator is more 
concerned with the soundness of the financial system and, therefore, with the financial 
perfomance of the MFI, and less concerned with the need to reach as many clients as possible. 
Rating by an external agency seems to matter because return on investment (ROE) improves in 
the year following rating (Table 3, Model 2). MFIs with audited financial statements seem to 
perform worse than MFI without audited financial statements (Table 3, Model 3). This result 
should not be interpreted as auditing being inefficient mechanism of external control. Rather, as 
performance indicators are self-reported, MFIs without audited financial statements may be 
overestimating their performance. Therefore, auditing is an important control for the quality of 
financial performance reporting. 
Managerial pay affects MFI performance. Perhaps most surprisingly, performance-based 
incentives affect not financial results but outreach as suggested by the negative and significant 
coefficient of Fixed Wage (Table 4, Model 1). That is, MFIs that pay bonuses achieve better 
outreach. This is surprising because in MFIs that use performance-based pay, on average, 60 
percent of the bonus depends on financial performance and 40 percent depends on performance 
in terms of outreach. This result suggests that either managers place higher personal value on 
outreach as suggested by the literature on non-profits, or achieving better outreach is easier than 
achieving financial results, therefore manager focus on outreach. The result also suggests that 
there are problems with using high powered incentives when the manager is expected to achieve 
dual objectives (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). 
The outreach mission seems to be pursued less by managers with longest experience in 
microfinance prior to taking their current job and this relationship is statistically significant! This 
result is surprising but it may indicate that experienced managers are hired to improve the 
financial results of the MFIs and that is why these managers may be shifting their focus away 
from outreach. At the same time, it does not seem that managerial experiences positively affect 
                                                 
7 An alternative, market-based indicator of performance is the Tobin’s q, measured as the current market value of 
the company divided by the replacement cost of the company’s assets, which is usually measured as the book value 
of the company’s assets. 
8 In the corporate governance literature, accounting-based measures are credited for not suffering from anticipation 
problems and market moods. 
  8financial performance although the latter result may be due to the small number of years for 
which data is available.  
Managers who perceive their compensation to be higher than the compensation they can 
get at an alternative job seem to focus on the MFIs financial performance and achieve better 
financial results (Table 4, Model 2). This result is significant at 10 percent level even after 
correcting for quality of financial statement reporting. Better paid managers indeed look at the 
MFI as a business and may be indifferent to the outreach mission. 
The results on board size and board tenure indicate that the MFI boards share similarities 
with bank boards and with non-profit boards (Table 5). As in banks, performance seems to 
improve with size and after a point decrease, but this link is not statistically significant. The 
financial performance of MFIs who have boards with longer tenure, and specifically with boards 
with unlimited tenure is better than the financial performance of MFIs with limited board term. 
This is consistent with findings of on non-profit boards, yet it is surprising that board tenure 
affect financial performance and does not affect outreach! MFI boards in the region may 
understand the goals of the MFI as becoming financially sustainable and may be paining less 
attention to the outreach mission. 
Board diversity seems to be unrelated to the MFIs’ mission of outreach (Table 5, Model 
1). None of the four indicators of board diversity is statistically significant in the regression for 
outreach. Surprisingly, the proportion of expatriates, community leaders and non-voting 
members on the board influences return on investment and this relationship in statistically 
significant! The proportion of women also has a positive effect on financial performance as the 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant in the operational self-sustainability equation 
(Table 6, Model 3). 
Expatriates influence negatively financial sustainability perhaps because they bring easy 
donation or grants. This result, combined with the positive result on return on investment, 
suggest that many the MFIs may have reported ROE unadjusted for grants and donations.  
Board independence, as suggested by the agency theory influences MFI performance 
(Table 7). Boards with higher proportion of insiders have less active borrowers and achieve 
worse return on assets. The most surprising result here is that client outreach is negatively 
affected by the proportion of donor representatives on the board! This result confirms the notion 





This paper studies how various governance mechanisms influence the performance of MFIs in 
CEE & NIS. Using insights from the corporate governance literature, the literature on non-profit 
boards and the literature on board of banks, we test how MFI performance is affected by the 
external control mechanisms, by management remuneration and by size and diversity of and by 
stakeholder representation on the MFI boards. Results suggest that in CEE & NIS the focus of 
MFIs is on financial performance and less so on reaching many clients. Perhaps the most 
surprising here is that it is donors, not managers who drive this process. There is some evidence 
that either because they place higher personal value to outreach or because it is more profitable 
but managers respond to incentives for outreach more than they do to incentives for financial 
sustainability. 
  9 
Table 1. Variables Definition 
Variable  Definition 
ROE  Return on equity; measures the rate of return on the average equity for the 
current year; since self-reported, may not be adjusted for grants and donations 
ROA  Return on assets; measure how well the MFI uses its total assets to generate 
returns; since self-reported may not be adjusted for grants and donations 
OSS  Operational self-sufficiency = Operating revenue / (Financial expense + Loan 
Loss Provision + Operating Expense) 
  
Measures how well the MFI can cover its costs through operating revenues. 
FS  Financial self-sufficiency = Operating revenue adjusted for subsidized financing 
/ (Financial expense + Loan Loss Provision + Operating Expense) 
 
Measures how well the MFI could cover its cost if its operations were not 
subsidized and the expansion was funded with commercial =cost liabilities.  
Log (No. active 
borrowers) 
Logarithm of the number of current borrowers, that is the number of individuals 
that currently have an outstanding loan balancewith the MFI or are responsible 
for repaying any portion of the gross loan portfolio  
MFI age  Number of years since inception 
Log(Total Assets)  Logarithm of the total assets of the MFI. Total assets include all assets net of 
contra asset accounts such as the loan loss reserve and  accumulated 
depreciation. 
   
Regulated  A dummy that equals one if the MFI is regulated/supervised by a government 
regulatory agency and zero otherwise 
Rated  A dummy that equals one if the MFI is rated by a specialized MFI rating agency 
and zero otherwise 
Audited  A dummy that equals one if the financial statement of the MFI are audited and 
zero otherwise  
Fixed Wage   A dummy that equals one if the manager receives a fixed salary and zero 
otherwise 
Higher Wage   A dummy that equals one if the manager estimated that his is paid more than 
what he could get at a similar job  
Board Size   Number of board members 
Unlimited Term  A dummy that equals one if the board has unlimited mandate 
No. Board Meetings  The number of board meetings per year 
Insiders  The proportion of voting board members that are also employees of the MFI 
Non-affiliated outsiders  The proportion of board members who do not have an affiliation with any of the 
stakeholders of the MFI 
Donor Representatives  The proportion of board members who represent the interest of the donors or 
grant giving organization  
Creditor 
Representatives 
The proportion of board members who represent the interest of the MFI 
creditors 
Investor representatives  The proportion of board members who represent the interest of the MFI 
investors/owners of equity  
Women directors  The proportion of women on the board members  
Expatriates  The proportion expatriates on the board  
Community Leaders  The proportion of community leaders on the board 
Non-voting  The proportion of non-voting members 
New Manager  A dummy that equals one if the manager was hired in the current year, zero 
otherwise 
Manager’s Experience 
in MFI industry (yrs) 
The number of years in the manager spent in the MFI industry prior to being 
hired at this MFI 
 
  
  10Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variable  No of 
observations 
Mean Std.  Dev. 
ROE   148 -2.336  91.10 
ROA  166 3.038  29.29 
OSS  257 0.980 0.56 
FS  209 0.829 0.41 
No. Active Borrowers  457 7,268.198  64,943.26 
MFI Age  586 2.563 1.73 
Total Assets  
($ thousands) 
243 10,905.720  42,953.93 
Log(Total Assets)  243 14.058 1.96 
Audit  311 0.820 0.38 
Regulated  480 0.650 0.48 
Rated  267 0.337 0.47 
Board Size   282 5.897 2.15 
Unlimited Term  131 0.237 0.43 
No. Board Meetings  138 4.971 2.99 
Fixed Wage  138 0.768 0.42 
Changes   170 0.182 0.39 
Manager’s wage higher than 
possible alternatives 
170 0.118 0.32 
Manager’s wage lower than possible 
alternatives 
170 0.324 0.47 
Women Directors   277 0.206 0.25 
Expatriates  138 0.266 0.36 
Community Leaders  277 0.086 0.16 
Non-voting  277 0.009 0.04 
Insiders  146 0.111 0.18 
Non-affiliated Outsiders   138 0.582 0.33 
Donor Representatives  282 0.177 0.31 
Client Representatives  282 0.057 0.19 
Creditor Representatives  138 0.044 0.17 
 
  11Table 3. Table External Control 
  Log(No active 
borrowers)  ROE OSS 
Constant  -1.640  -446.953 -1.063 
  (1.44)  (3.08)*** (1.42) 
Log (Total Assets)  0.646  19.342  0.161 
  (8.42)***  (2.17)**  (3.09)*** 
MFI age  0.022  93.782 0.109 
  (0.17)  (1.88)*  (1.01) 
MFI age squared  0.001 -11.740  -0.016 
  (0.10) (1.50)  (1.35) 
Audited   -0.329 -42.247  -0.507 
  (0.89) (1.09)  (2.13)** 
Rated (lag)  0.489  54.635 0.331 
  (1.44)  (1.70)* (1.65) 
Regulated  -0.317 56.477  -0.113 
  (1.53) (1.47)  (0.71) 
      
Observations  78 55  66 
R-squared  0.73 0.19  0.49 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses         






Table 4. Managerial Compensation and Performance 
   Log(No. Active Borrowers)   OSS 
   LogNac oss 
Constant  -4.096 0.182 
   (3.18)*** (0.18) 
MFI Age   0.220 0.032 
   (2.96)*** (0.88) 
Log (Total Assets)  0.801  0.240 
   (9.19)***  (6.44)** 
Fixed Wage  -0.636 0.174 
   (1.85)* (1.25) 
Higher Wage   0.396  0.333 
   (0.95)  (1.84)* 
Manager  Experience   -0.260 -0.048 
   (2.20)** (0.89) 
CEO New   0.060 -0.030 
   (0.28) (0.34) 
Regulated  -0.567  
   (2.09)**  
Audited    -0.366 
    (1.72)* 
     
Observations  72 60 
R-squared  0.559 0.502 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses         
*significant at 10% ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
  12Table 5. Board Size and Board Terms 
   ROA  Log (No. active borrowers) 
Constant  -116.122  -4.139 
   (3.12)***  (1.87)* 
Log(Total Assets)  4.881  0.744 
   (3.67)***  (8.94)*** 
MFI Age  1.463  0.396 
   (0.61) (2.69) 
MFI Age Squared  -0.142  -0.028 
   (0.66) (1.84)* 
Board Size   14.233 -0.177 
   (1.53) (0.30) 
Board Size Squared    -0.968 -0.164 
   (1.44) (0.37) 
Unlimited Term  18.948 0.299 
   (2.05)*** (0.40) 
No. Board Meetings  -1.373 0.046 
  (1.59) (0.71) 
    
Observations  64 80 
R-squared  0.12 0.58 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses         
*significant at 10% ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 6. Board Diversity  
  ROE OSS  FS  Log (No. Active 
Borrowers) 
Constant  -712.529 -2.323  -3.013  -2.626 
  (3.69)*** (3.49)*** (5.44)***  (2.16)** 
Log(Total Assets)  26.863 0.194  0.267  0.692 
  (2.46)** (4.70)***  (6.47)***  (7.92)*** 
MFI Age  117.886 0.195  0.106  0.186 
  (2.21)** (2.66)*** (2.31)**  (1.61) 
MFI Age Squared  -13.735 -0.024  -0.016  -0.013 
  (1.66) (2.84)***  (3.19)*** (0.92) 
Women Directors
1  -150.640 0.644  -0.069  -0.061 
  (1.48) (1.80)* (0.26)  (0.08) 
Expatriates
1   156.293 0.185  -0.362 -0.727 
  (2.09)** (0.73) (2.19)** (1.52) 
Community Leaders
1  356.291 -0.238  0.261  0.847 
  (2.15)** (0.40)  (0.91)  (0.67) 
Non-voting Members
1  590.639 -1.656  0.027  2.746 
  (1.74)* (1.22)  (0.04)  (0.89) 
Audited   92.360 0.038 -0.292   
  (1.47) (0.16)  (1.75)*   
Regulated       -0.720 
      (2.16)** 
      
Observations  41 43 34 51 
R squared  0.40 0.53 0.75 0.67 
1 Lagged value. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses,  
*significant at 10% ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
  13Table 7. Interest Representation 
  Log (No Active Borrowers)  ROA 
Constant  -1.350 -50.376 
  (0.90) (1.51) 
MFI Age  0.070  8.205 
  (0.61)  (2.65)*** 
MFI Age Squared  -0.004  -1.274 
  (0.30)  (3.10)*** 
Log(Total Assets)  0.690  3.777 
  (7.87)***  (1.72)* 
Insiders
1   -1.323  -48.161 
  (1.25)  (2.49)** 
Investor Representatives
1  -0.621 -1.496 
  (0.59) (0.09) 
Non-affiliated outsiders
1  -1.122 0.492 
  (1.46) (0.03) 
Donor Representatives
1  -1.940 -13.791 
  (2.47)** (1.01) 
Clients
1  0.373 -69.176 
  (0.16) (0.67) 
Creditor Representatives
1  -1.220 4.620 
  (1.54) (0.34) 
Audit   -4.628 
   (0.60) 
Regulated  -0.443  
  (2.04)**  
    
Observations  54 40 
R-squared  0.65 0.50 
1Lagged value  
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